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Neo-liberal policy as a means for development has been present in our society 
since the first experiment in Chile during the 1970s. This experience came to be 
known as an economic ‘miracle’ and the model was soon imitated by surrounding 
countries. In these countries income inequality has been a well-known feature and 
the Gini Coefficient in all Latin American countries exceeds the world average. 
There is however no consensus that income inequality is an actual societal prob-
lem, or that the implementation of policy is needed in the struggle against it.  
 The strengthening of the middle class is by numerous scholars, especially 
within the modernisation theory, mentioned as an important factor for democrati-
sation. Increased marginalisation is opposed to the concept of a strong middle 
class, which is one of the reasons why it may be considered a negative pattern. 
Scholars advocating neo-liberal policy, on the other hand, mean that income ine-
quality not is a problem in itself and that with time the free market will even out 
the gaps.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 PURPOSE AND QUESTION AT ISSUE 
 
Neo-liberalism has spread around the world since the 1970s. The first example we 
saw was the experiment carried out by the Chicago Boys in Chile during the Pino-
chet regime. This was an experiment that came to be known as an economic 
‘miracle’ (Barton&Murray 2002:333). I consider neo-liberalism to be an important 
development model to study mainly because of the great impact it has had both on 
developed and developing countries throughout the world the last decades, espe-
cially in Latin America.  
 The main purpose of this essay is to examine neo-liberal policies as a means 
for development. Since the Chilean neo-liberal experience often is referred to as a 
miracle I find it interesting to look into the negative societal effects of this specific 
case1. The two main negative outcomes were increased unemployment2 and in-
come inequality. Great income gaps are a common feature for all Latin America 
and this is the issue I have chosen to focus on. Table 1 shows that a higher level of 
income inequality is negatively correlated with a high level of democracy. This 
connection is also supported by Figures 1a and 1b3. In spite of this, not everybody 
agrees that income inequality is a negative outcome or that something should be 
done to change this kind of situation. My hypothesis is that neo-liberal develop-
ment breeds income inequality which in its turn is a threat to democracy. Since 
the neo-liberal approach is highly present I believe that it is important to clarify 
both if income inequality is a negative outcome, and in that case why. This leads 
me to the main question of this work: Can increased income inequality be re-
garded as an effect of neo-liberal development and how does it affect society?  
    
 
1.2 METHOD AND THEORY 
 
The essay is meant to examine the connection between neo-liberal development 
and income inequality, and its societal effects. In order to do this I have made an 
empirical study of Chile, and to some extent Latin America, where I review the 
development under neo-liberal policies since the 1970s. The neo-liberal develop-
ment model is linked to more historical development theory with the purpose to 
have a more solid base for the assumptions. It is not my purpose to lead a norma-
tive discussion, but it is interesting to have the question of whether neo-liberalism 
is a desirable alternative for development or not, in mind. It would have been pos-
                                                 
1 Since this model rapidly spread to other Latin American countries examples from these will 
therefore also be discussed. 
2 Income inequality is partly a result of increased unemployment which is a matter that should be 
deeply discussed, however separately and not in this essay. 
3 All tables and figures are presented in the appendix. 
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sible to make a comparative study of countries that have gone through similar 
processes but my interest in this matter is specifically on Chile since it has been so 
widely praised and copied, something that has occurred even though the regime 
was authoritarian and repressing. 
 The first part of the essay is based on development theory and the connection 
between modernisation and neo-liberalism. The second part is on income inequal-
ity and its impact on society and possible democratic effects. I will compare the 
neo-liberal view on inequality with other scholars and use empirical examples 
from Chile, the neo-liberal ‘tiger’, to show what the consequences have been from 
the economic development.  
 The Gini Coefficient is used as a measure for income inequality. It is a measure 
developed by the World Bank and it is a widely accepted concept in this matter.  
 
 
1.3 MATERIAL AND DELIMITATION 
 
Except for the discussion part I try not to be too subjective, but I am well aware 
that my own preferences are reflected. I have tried to use literature both from an 
economic (mainly pro-neo-liberalism) and a societal (mainly con-neo-liberalism) 
perspective. I have however found more material from a societal perspective 
which can be one explanation why most of the scholars presented have had a 
negative approach to the neo-liberal development model. I have used books, arti-
cles, and Internet sources since the 1950s in order to have a perspective that is as 
wide as possible. 
 Neo-liberalism is a means for economic growth and does not bother much with 
state policies, other than that most policies should be left to the market. I study 
neo-liberalism as a development model but since this is not an economic essay 
focus is not on the specific reforms in the economic sector. What I do emphasise 
are negative societal effects of this model, more closely the increase of income 
inequality. 
 
 
1.4 DISPOSITION 
 
I will first go into development theory where the modernisation theory and neo-
liberalism will be discussed first separately and than compared to each other. I 
will then bring up the issue of income inequality and its societal effects, mainly 
from a democratic point of view. I discuss the connection to neo-liberalism that 
has been focused on in the literature used and the different ideas of whether it 
harms or benefits society. Some parallels are drawn to empirical examples but 
most I save to the next chapter where Latin America in general and Chile in par-
ticular is examined. In this part I start with a historical overview of Chile, mainly 
since the 1970s, in order to understand the societal situation. I do not believe that 
it is possible to understand the development if one does not understand the his-
tory. Finally I will lead a discussion based on the facts and opinions presented and 
it is mainly here my own perspective and reflections come in.  
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2. MODERNISATION THEORY 
AND NEO-LIBERALISM 
 
 
 
 
In the Western countries and their allied in the Third World the modernisation 
theory was the dominating perspective on development after World War II. It was 
based on the thought that Third World countries should follow the Western road 
to success through adopting similar measures. The critique was strong and came 
from many different scholars, whence some even claimed that this kind of devel-
opment would lead to tyranny. Times were changing and soon neo-liberal recipes 
for development became more common in the big Western countries and in the 
powerful and dominating international organisations. Both economists and politi-
cal scientists started blaming Third World failures on too heavy political interven-
tions and on the attempts to radical political shortcuts. These new scholars 
founded the concept ‘instant democracy’ and earlier studies on the many compli-
cated pre-conditions for actual democratisation were neglected. In the late 1980s 
people started to realise that neo-liberalism not often resulted in the expected out-
come and that political intervention actually was what resulted in the extraordi-
nary socio-economic development in Southeast Asia (Törnquist 1996:44-47). I 
will below explain the main idea of neo-liberalism as development but I will start 
by describing the modernisation theory since I consider this theory as an impor-
tant base for neo-liberal thinking. My interest is on economic growth as a means 
for democratisation and societal development; hence that is the part I will focus 
on.  
 
 
2.1 THE MODERNISATION THEORY 
 
According to the modernisation theory political modernisation was an effect of 
social, economic, and cultural modernisation (Törnquist 1996:53). It developed in 
the post-World War II era and there are three main events that stood for the foun-
dation: (1) the rise of the superpower US who was the only Western nation that 
was strengthened by the war. In the 1950s they more or less took over the respon-
sibility of managing the whole world. (2) The communist influence of the Soviet 
Union was extended to China and Korea. (3) The end of the European colonial 
empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America created many new nation-states in the 
Third World. These new countries were looking for a development-model that 
could promote economy in order to enhance political independence. The moderni-
sation school was, not surprisingly, founded by American scholars (encouraged by 
the political elite) as a means to avoid losing the new states to the Soviet commu-
nist bloc. It was generously supported both by the US government and by private 
foundations (So 1990:17-18). 
 Since Aristotle the theory that democracy is only possible in societies that are 
fairly wealthy and have a low level of poverty, has been present. A society with a 
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small elite and a large impoverished mass creates oligarchy or tyranny (Lipset 
1959:75). Max Weber was also an adherent of the modernisation theory and he 
suggested that modern democracy only can develop under the unique conditions 
of capitalist industrialisation (Lipset 1959:73). This development theory means 
that to overcome the great gap between rich and poor countries the more underde-
veloped countries should imitate the earlier developmental process of the more 
developed countries to gain the same qualities (Hettne 1992:60). 
 
2.1.1 Theory 
 
In the search for its own theory the modernists adopted both evolutionary and 
functionalist theory. Evolutionary theory fits well when explaining the develop-
ment to modern society in Western Europe and therefore it was thought to be use-
ful for modernising even Third World countries. As can be understood by its 
name it sees societal development as evolutionary; that it is unidirectional, desir-
able, and slow. It will take centuries to complete such an evolution as the one 
from a simple, primitive society to a complex, modern society (So 1990:18-19). 
 The functionalist theory is influenced by biology and means that the institu-
tions in a society are, just as biological organisms, interrelated and interdependent 
(such as economy and government). Just like the body, society will always restore 
equilibrium so if one institution changes, others will change accordingly – a chain 
reaction starts. This also means that institutions not fight each other (So 1990:20-
21). 
 
2.1.2 Economic Growth and Democracy 
 
Within development studies the modernisation theory is what mainly has focused 
on the question of the connection between economic growth and democratisation. 
The most prominent of scholars is Seymour Martin Lipset who means that eco-
nomic development leads to increased income, greater economic security, and 
higher education (Lipset 1959:83). In the scientific periodical ‘American Political 
Science’ he 1959 presented his thesis that “the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959:75). He explains 
this by pointing at a chain reaction:  
 
economic growth Æ increased level of education Æ increased economic efficacy 
because of rational arguments that are universal and puts the individual in focus 
Æ bigger tolerance for differences in opinion Æ a more democratic culture.  
 
With a higher living standard people have more time to devote to questions about 
politics and society since the perspective changes when food for the day and pure 
survival no longer are critical issues. Questions about political rights, civil liber-
ties, rule of law, democratic procedures, and corruption had earlier been secon-
dary (Karvonen 1997:28-29). Other important societal effects of economic growth 
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are that the state gets richer which creates new career opportunities for all groups. 
NGOs also arise which is important for democratic development and consolida-
tion since it both increases political participation and creates opposition (Kar-
vonen 1997:30). 
 
The Middle Class 
 The foundation for the chain reaction is the expanded and strengthened middle 
class. A society has better chances to fight or even avoid extremist groups if the 
hierarchy is diamond shaped instead of triangular. It also affects the way people 
see themselves and others and they treat each other more like equals – a smaller 
group is no longer automatically inferior. If people are no longer as inferior they 
might be considered to be given political rights, above all they will claim it and 
have the strength to carry through their demands. The elite itself is often opposed 
to democracy since it means they would have to share their power and privileges 
(Lipset 1959:83-84). The role of the elite is highly important both in the discus-
sion on neo-liberalism since this model usually is implemented by this very group. 
It is also an important factor for explaining the Chilean society during the Pino-
chet era. These are however topics that further will be discussed below. 
 Socio-economic development not only changes the balance of class power 
through the enlargement of the working class, but also erodes the size and the 
power of the large land-owning classes who can be seen as the most anti-
democratic force (Rueschemeyer et al 1992:76). 
  
Education 
 Lipset stated that one of the important factors for democratisation is that eco-
nomic growth promotes a higher level of education. Education is an important and 
well-examined variable and there is strong positive correlation between higher 
education and higher democratic standards. In 1959 education was in all relevant 
studies proved to be far more significant than occupation or income. It is a neces-
sary condition, however not sufficient (Lipset 1959:76-79). 
 The way I see it a middle class will not emerge by itself but through the in-
creased education level. However, if people not are given the same opportunities 
the class differences would rather increase. I will come back to this issue later on 
in the discussion.  
 
2.1.3 Operationalisation 
 
There are two distinct traditions of research that have come to quite different re-
sults on the issue of the connection between economic growth and democratisa-
tion; quantitative cross-national comparisons and comparative historical studies 
with qualitative emphasis. In the quantitative studies a positive correlation be-
tween development and democracy has been found, whereas the qualitative stud-
ies rather trace the rise of democracy to a favourable historical constellation of 
conditions in early capitalism, and thus being more pessimistic to the developing 
countries today (Rueschemeyer et al 1992:1, 3). 
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2.2 CRITIQUE ON THE MODERNISATION THEORY 
  
The modernisation theory at first received great optimism, but that was soon to be 
broken down and the idea of sustainable development and democratisation 
through liberalisation has been strongly criticised, mainly for being typical results 
of Western researchers. The Western values are assumed to be natural and un-
doubtedly the ‘best’, which is an expression of Western superiority. Since Third 
World countries are assumed to want Westernisation, alternative positions are not 
considered. Is democracy really necessary for economic development? Can devel-
oping countries not create their own models? (So 1990:54-55) 
 
2.2.1 Societal Conflict  
 
As a response to the argument that extremism would decrease through an emerged 
middle class Huntington, as one of the main critics, asserts that through moderni-
sation societal and political conflicts aggravate rather than diminish. When big 
changes are set in motion, ethnic and religious belonging gets more important for 
people and fundamentalism is more easily evolved. This can start conflicts that 
often result in serious political clashes. In a society with increasing urbanisation, 
education, and awareness, demands and expectations in social and economic re-
spects grow. If the state fails in fulfilling these demands society will suffer from 
alienation and strong tensions. In this kind of society political and religious ex-
tremism is bred (Hadenius 1994:80-83). Huntington was also one of those who 
argued that socio-economic modernisation not automatically leads to democracy, 
but rather to new political and social conflicts impossible to handle for the pre-
existing political institutions (Törnquist 1996:118-119). 
 
2.2.2 Operationalisation 
 
Since modernisation researchers have a strong tendency to use arguments on a 
high level of abstraction, it is hard to distinguish which country and which histori-
cal period they are referring to. They use cross-national research at a given time 
instead of historical research over time, for example an assumption that 20th cen-
tury China was at the same developmental stage as 18th century Great Britain and 
therefore should use the same measures to reach the same results. This kind of 
comparison is not possible if one wants to reach a scientifically valid result (So 
1990:56-57). 
 One massive result though remains that cannot be explained away by problems 
of operationalisation. This is that “there is a stable positive association between 
social and economic development and political democracy” (Rueschemeyer et al 
1992:29).  
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2.2.3 Neo-Marxist Critique 
 
According to neo-Marxist critique the modernisation theory is nothing but a stra-
tegic move from the West during the Cold War, and this way of thinking leads to 
un-revolutionary behaviour, hence hindering development (So 1990:58). Another 
strong critique lies in the neglecting of foreign domination, such as colonialism 
and the control over Third World countries by multinational corporations. Neo-
Marxists mean that even after the colonial domination, Third World countries are 
still dominated by Western countries; politically, economically, and culturally. 
How can such a crucial factor be neglected? (So 1990:58) 
  
2.2.4 The Dependency School 
 
One of the strongest critiques however came from the Dependency School, which 
developed from social scientists of the Third World, especially in Latin America 
during the 1960s, as a counter reaction (Hettne 1992:69). The dependency theo-
rists meant that capitalism and modernisation in the Third World generated un-
derdevelopment, and that it not can generate democracy, only dictatorship (Rude-
beck&Törnquist 1995:2, Törnquist 1996:74). 
 
2.2.5 Empirical Examples 
 
Critics did not have a hard time finding empirical examples that deviated from the 
development-pattern explained by the modernisation theory. India is one, where 
the socio-economic development was low but with simultaneously good democ-
ratic achievement. Also in the rich Arab world great deviations were found since 
the countries were rich but with no sign of democratisation. Overall it was shown 
in Latin America that despite major efforts no economic take-off occurred, rather 
retrogression. The same happened from a democratic point of view, and Latin 
America was in the mid-1960s broadly occupied by different military regimes 
(Hadenius 1994:80-81). 
 
2.2.6 Response to the Critique 
 
The modernisation theory had its revival in the late 1970s. It was still focused on 
Third World development; it still meant that modernisation is good for these 
countries, and still used terms like tradition and modernity. It however responded 
to the critique and some striking differences can be found. The critique received 
from the neo-Marxists has been called propagandistic and a misreading of their 
arguments, but most critique has been considered and some dubious assumptions 
eliminated (So 1990:60-62). 
 This new modernisation theory opens up for new research and provides a more 
sophisticated analysis. Traditional values can actually promote growth (e.g. Hong 
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Kong and Asian Values), and focus is now put on the unique development of each 
case – they now use theory to explain individual cases instead of the opposite. 
More attention is also given to multi-institutional analysis, including social, cul-
tural, political, and economic institutions (So 1990:86-87). 
 My focus is on the part of the modernisation theory that emphasises economic 
growth, which leads me to the more contemporary theory of development through 
neo-liberalism. 
 
 
2.3 DEVELOPMENT THROUGH NEO-LIBERAL POLICY 
 
Milton Friedman’s reworking of the neo-classical economic doctrine is what we 
today refer to as neo-liberalism, and the first experiment was carried out in Chile 
(Barton&Murray 2002:333). 
 Just like Lipset’s thoughts on development, neo-liberalism is based on eco-
nomic growth, but here the important aspect is how this is achieved. Too much 
politics was the problem since it interfered with, and thereby negatively disturbed, 
the market. The foundation is that individuals are rational creatures who seek to 
maximise their own profit, and that economic gains were in public interest. Capi-
talistic market-economy was seen as crucial for democratic development (Törn-
quist 1996:85-87). The neo-liberal economic policies are mainly based on market 
liberalization, the dismantling of the state, indiscriminate opening, deregulation, 
and financial speculation (Borón 2000:95). The expected results of less money 
spent on inefficient production are higher efficiency, better rule-of-law, improved 
civil liberties and political rights, and liberal democracy. But the economy has to 
be market-led (Törnquist 1996:85-87). This can be compared to Lipset’s chain 
reaction where economic profit generates well-being and political awareness. 
 The optimal speed of liberalisation has been debated but many analysts agree 
that gradual is better than ‘big-bang’ since it gives time for firms to restructure 
their operations, resulting in lower unemployment (Edwards&Lederman 
1998:11). In this matter the neo-liberal theory agrees with the evolutionary theory 
of modernisation; development is and should be slow. 
  
2.3.1 Critique 
 
Market liberalisation deeply affects the competitive rules for local entrepreneurs. 
As a result from the monetary policy there will be a decline in domestic demand 
and local market in combination with mounting worldwide competition.4 The 
ones most affected are the local consumers where cleavages increase. The upper 
middle class will likely benefit from lower prices for sophisticated imported 
goods, the lower middle class will suffer from higher prices on basic, local goods, 
and unemployment will soar (Duquette 1999:13).  
                                                 
4 In Latin America this is likely to drive businessmen out of the international market, as well as the 
domestic. 
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 Bresser Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski advocate social democratic policy in 
new democracies even though growth has not yet resumed. Those hardest hit by 
the market reforms must be protected (lower middle class in urban areas) and 
economic reforms oriented towards their welfare (in the transitionary states with 
those preconditions). These economies should step away from liberalism and the 
deeply founded tradition of political exclusion and economic inequality. The de-
gree to which the new democracies distance themselves can be seen on the pur-
sued social policies (Duquette 1999:176-177). 
 According to Veltmeyer and Petras neo-liberal policies in fact have little to do 
with economic development (Veltmeyer 2000:95). De Vylder means that the neo-
liberal model carried out by the military regime in Chile is incompatible with a 
democratic regime. It was however also in contradiction with the authoritarian 
regime since there were no free exchange of ideas and information, which is cru-
cial for the efficiency and development desired by the neo-liberal model.  
 
[…] a systematic and coherent application of the neo-liberal model is incompatible 
with a democratic regime, and also to a dictatorial regime. The model is, hence, in-
compatible with itself.5
De Vylder 1985:38 
 
I find this argument interesting and worth noting. The neo-liberal experiment in 
Chile was carried out under extreme conditions and some mean it would not be 
possible under a democratic regime. How can it then be recommended? There is a 
lot more critique to discuss but since it mainly concerns poverty and income ine-
qualities I have chosen to put that in chapter three and four.  
 
2.3.2 Comparison to the Modernisation Theory 
 
I see the neo-liberal development model as not too distinguished from modernisa-
tion theory, or more specifically Lipset’s thesis, that economic growth generates 
democracy. They have the same kind of theory on a chain reaction starting in eco-
nomic growth and ending up in improved well-being. The neo-liberal model is 
though not applied with the desire to create democracy, but rather a proposal on 
how to achieve economic growth. This is where I see the main difference from 
Lipset’s thesis and also one of the clearest shortages of using neo-liberalism as a 
development model. I believe that the cooperation between economy and politics 
is crucial in the struggle for a ‘good’ or desirable society. 
 The neo-liberal policies have frequently been accused of generating income 
inequalities, which is what the next chapter will examine. 
 
                                                 
5 This is my translation. The original quote: “una aplicación sistemática y coherente del modelo 
neoliberal es incompatible con un régimen democrático, y tambien con un régimen dictatorial. El 
modelo es, en fin, incompatible consigo mismo.” 
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3. INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
 
 
 
In an unequal society with great class-divergence, the poor (the many) have less 
education, less wealth, less honour, and most importantly less individual power 
(Rueschemeyer et al 1992:41). Lipset means that poorer countries generally have 
a higher degree of income inequalities.  
 
In countries with great inequality of wealth, the poor are more likely 
to be a threat to the privileged and the established order. The rich in 
turn tend to be hostile to democracy, both because they feel threatened 
and because they often view it even as morally wrong to let the poor 
and wretched participate in political decisions – an arrogant attitude 
which in turn feeds the resentment of the poor.  
Rueschemeyer et al 1992:13-14 
 
This explains Lipset’s view of a growing middle class as an important breeder for 
democratisation. Increases in wealth, education, communication, and equality are 
results of industrialisation (Rueschemeyer et al 1992:13-14). 
 Social reforms must be revised since both an unequal situation and poverty are 
both ethically unacceptable. The population living in poverty are shut off from the 
educational and job opportunities, proper healthcare, and decent quality of life 
that are every person’s right. Politically it is a problem because the poor cannot 
become responsible citizens to involve in the political process unless they are full 
partners in social development and the production apparatus. When 40 percent of 
a nations people are poor an unproductive, no country has ever been able to com-
pete on the global marketplace, hence an economic problem (Iglesias 1993:29-
30). Utilitarianism addresses inequality as ‘distributional badness’ since there is 
not a maximisation of utility (Sen 1997:115-116). 
 Jackson means that income gaps between employers and employees have 
deepened during the last 10-15 years. According to Borón, the reason that the 
United Kingdom has the most unequal structure of income distribution in the 
European Union, is the heritage of Margaret Thatcher and John Major and all due 
to neo-liberalism (Borón 2000:109). I will further explain what this type of argu-
ment is based on.  
 
 
3.1 INCOME INEQUALITY AND NEO-LIBERALISM 
  
A higher rate of savings allows a higher rate of investment, which allows a higher 
level of productive capital, which allows more output, hence economic growth. 
There is a chain reaction from public savings to economic growth. The ones who 
save are the rich so more money to the poor would lead to less savings; unequal 
distribution generates growth. 
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The neo-liberal position is that maximum economic growth will be obtained by al-
lowing the distribution of income to be determined by the market; governments 
should not adopt policies that would redistribute income away from the rich and to-
wards the poor.  
MacEwan 1999:73 
 
According to neo-liberal adherents, income inequalities will have an increasing 
trend in developing countries before levelling forces become strong enough to 
first stabilise and then reduce them. This will occur if the government does not 
interfere and the free market can act automatically. Hence, these countries are 
encouraged to wait and be patient. Efforts to help the poor through subsidies or 
distributive policies would only end up hurting them since such measures have 
growth-reducing impacts (MacEwan 1999:74). 
 Martin Feldstein however argues that income inequality not is an issue that 
should be dealt with through the implementation of new policies. The real prob-
lem does not lie in income inequality but in poverty, which is where efforts of 
improvement ought to be put. He makes an example where he states that if a 
number of rich people are given $ 1 000 each, by a bird (!), the Gini Coefficient6 
would rise but no one is worse off. He, as many other economists, refers to the 
Pareto principle that concludes that ‘a change is good if it makes someone better 
off without making anyone else worse off’. In economic evaluation of policies it 
is a widely accepted argument (Feldstein 1999:1). This arises wonder whether 
well-being should be measured only in economical terms, and I consider it to be 
extremely insufficient. I see this is a great example of the importance of commu-
nication between politicians and economists, and of how easy it is for one to ne-
glect the other.  
 MacEwan questions whether it could be so that the poorer would be even 
poorer if the rich were not so rich and/or that in order to improve the position of 
the poor it is first necessary to improve the position of the rich (MacEwan 
1999:67). 
 Income inequalities are supposed to generate growth since it enlarges public 
savings. MacEwan means that there are no data supporting the argument that un-
equal distribution enhances growth. Rather the other way around and that equality 
generates growth. He further argues that the neo-liberal adjustment programmes 
not should be considered an alternative since they generate large amounts of hu-
man suffering. The neo-liberal arguments that inequalities are good for economic 
growth are wrong also because it ignores the many ways it affects social and eco-
nomic relations (MacEwan 1999:82-83, 147). 
 Evidence proving that income equality has been good for growth are strong and 
the policies formulated by the IMF, the World Bank, and the US government can 
only be justified by the assertions that inequality promotes growth. They have 
however been forced to acknowledge reality. Latin America is probably the region 
where neo-liberalism has been strongest during the recent decades, and mean-
                                                 
6 “The Gini Coefficient measures the concentration of incomes in the nation, with a higher Gini 
Coefficient value implying more concentration.” (Feldstein 1999:2) The values are rated from 0 to 
1 but are commonly multiplied by 100.  
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while it has been an era of increasing inequalities in the very same area7 (MacE-
wan 1999:95-96). 
 Inequalities have increased throughout the world during the last 15 years, 
which has resulted in an extension of poverty and according to Veltmeyer there is 
no doubt of the connection between neo-liberal policy of adjustment and these 
results. Neo-liberalism has caused societal polarisation – winners and losers, thus 
one can say that the benefits of neo-liberalism have been highly concentrated to 
one group of which the majority is excluded. Politically theses policies have also 
generated effects, mainly in the form of rising resistance and protests (Veltmeyer 
2000:27). 
 Since the 1970s, after decreasing inequalities in the Western countries, the US 
and the UK once again had increasing figures, a trend that distinguishes these two 
countries. Rising inequalities is a clear indication that something is wrong in the 
world economy (MacEwan 1999:70-72). I would here like to emphasise that 
Reagan and Thatcher during the 1970s were the biggest advocates of neo-
liberalism and it was in their countries income inequalities increased. Can we al-
ready here start to see a connection? Borón has given these two politicians and 
neo-liberalism the whole blame for the increased marginalisation. 
 On several occasions throughout history crimes against humanity have been 
committed by people claiming that ‘the means meet the end’ (MacEwan 
1999:146). 
 
 
3.2 INCOME INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Both Aristotle and Rousseau stressed that socio-economic inequality was a hostile 
condition to democracy. They also assumed that the non-propertied groups of so-
ciety were excluded from participation. Jefferson did not believe in this exclusion, 
but he (too) argued that a democratic society had to be a one-class society. John 
Stuart Mill considered the growing prosperity and literacy, and the expansion of 
transportation and communication as means that increased people’s mobility and 
chances to organise. Hence, democracy was inevitable. Even if Mill’s position 
was proved wrong the history of democratisation cannot be understood without 
reference to class. The lower classes have been the once fighting for democracy 
(Rueschemeyer et al 1992:45-46). According to Lipset the elite has no interest in 
fighting for democracy since it would mean less power and privileges for them 
(Lipset 1959:84). This means that if the lower classes need strengthening to be 
able to push through democratisation, there are little incitements for the elite to 
give them that.  
 In a society suffering from poverty, high inequalities, and a non-functioning 
social security system people are likely to be prepared to support an authoritarian 
regime as long as it can meet the demands for social welfare. In other words, one 
must not underestimate the undemocratic effects of this issue, and its effects on 
democratic stability. It is a question of the hen or the egg, what provides what and 
                                                 
7 I will lead a further discussion on this matter in Chapter 4. 
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where could one begin? Inequality generates instability, but an improved and 
more stable democracy is needed to fight inequality (UNDP 2005:39-41). 
 Even though substantial inequalities are not completely incompatible with de-
mocratic development, a more egalitarian social structure is certainly more con-
ducive to democracy (Diamond et al 1999:48-49). 
 Class inequality is just one form of socio-economic inequality and those based 
on race or ethnicity and on gender are equally important. Gender inequalities have 
not been of critical importance historically, but may well be so for future devel-
opments in democracy. When women received the right to vote no significant 
differences were seen in any country. The importance of ethnicity and race rises 
when they are linked to class and/or when the linkage to the state apparatus is 
differentiated. Class differences can be reinforced or deepened and can sometimes 
create social segments that can be viewed as, and thus treated as, classes and may 
have a direct impact on democracy. In the functionalist view ethnic divisions con-
tribute to breakdown of democracy since they undermine social integration and 
societal consensus. Here it is argued that these divisions only are fatal for democ-
racy if they are related to class alignments (Rueschemeyer et al 1992:48-49). 
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4. CHILE AND NEO-LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
  
 
 
 
I will further discuss the issue of development through neo-liberal measures and 
to make it as clear as possible Chile (and to some extent the rest of Latin America) 
will be used as an empirical example since it was the first ‘experiment’ of imple-
menting neo-liberal policies, and later on used as a role model for economic de-
velopment. To understand the situation one must also know about the recent his-
tory of the country so I will start by giving a historical overview of the political 
situation. What I want to show is the strong hostility between left and right since 
the right to a larger extent supported the military and the economic policy. I also 
wish to highlight the fact that Chile while implementing neo-liberal policies were 
under an authoritarian regime with a tyrannous leader. 
 
 
4.1 A POLITICAL OVERVIEW  
 
Before the military-coup in Chile 1973, the country can be classified as a political 
success with a stable and uninterrupted case of democratic rule. For the latest 100 
years Chilean politics has predominantly been characterised by high level of party 
participation, open and fair elections, and strong respect for democratic freedoms. 
Already in the 19th century democratic institutions and procedures developed 
which separates Chile from other Latin American countries. Citizenship was how-
ever sharply restricted to men who owned property and were literate. Women’s 
suffrage was not established until well into the 20th century, as well as for the illit-
erate. From the 1920s middle class and working class were incorporated into the 
democratic political game. They grew stronger and gained power thanks to ur-
banisation, incipient industrialisation, and a booming export economy. An organ-
ised left now arose and thereby also sharp political polarisation (Valenzuela 
1999:191-193). 
 In the close election in 1958, Salvador Allende was edged out by only 2.7 per-
cent by the conservative businessman Jorge Alessandri. In the 1964 election, the 
right’s fear of the growing left made them support Eduardo Frei and the new Par-
tido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)8 that had replaced the Radicals as the largest and 
most powerful party of the centre. The Frei government received massive finan-
cial assistance from the US, which was used to dissolve the alliance with the right. 
In the 1970 election the right felt betrayed by the PDC and refused to support 
them. Thanks to this dispute, Allende won the election with only 36.2 percent of 
the votes. Shortly after this the democratic system collapsed due to vivid hostility 
between civil groups, and the military could seize power (Valenzuela1999:201). 
                                                 
8 The Christian Democratic Party (CDP) 
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 The breakdown in 1973 was related to the fall of the Allende government and 
the present economic crisis, but mainly due to the role economy played in the po-
litical struggle (Rueschemeyer et al 1992:210). 
 
4.1.1 The Pinochet Era 
 
The military had great support both from the elite and from business groups who 
supported the new institutions and were determined in their demands to never go 
back to a leftwing government (Gillespie 1990:62). All democratic institutions 
were now repressed. Political leaders were killed, exiled or persecuted, and parties 
and unions were banned or dismantled (Valenzuela 1999:193).  
 In 1982 the Chilean economy collapsed9 and unemployment rates were pushed 
up to almost 30 percent. It was not until now with the high levels of unemploy-
ment that political parties reasserted and started to demonstrate their discontent 
with the government and forced them to allow earlier banned parties who took 
over the leadership of the opposition movement. The opposition however failed 
since it had large inner fragmentation between those who sought peaceful and 
those who sought violent ‘negotiations’ (Valenzuela 1999:227). 
  
4.1.2 Democratisation  
 
The economic crisis of 1982 and 1983 resulted in the state taking over the banking 
system, which made the business sector completely dependent on state decisions. 
In the new constitution of 1980 a plebiscite was planned in 1988 on whether Pino-
chet should stay in power, and due to the economic reforms the right could not 
possibly abandon Pinochet in this plebiscite. The repression of democratic institu-
tions and the violations of Human Rights however made the PDC turn to the left 
(Valenzuela 1999:227).  
 The opposition parties were though stronger than the military thought and the 
last week before the election the opposition had managed an extraordinary mobili-
sation through media and door-to-door campaigns that defeated Pinochet 
(Valenzuela 1999:193, 229). Compromises were however necessary between the 
old and the new governments in order to establish a peaceful transferral of power. 
The old constitution was amended and the most undemocratic features were 
struck. By 85.7 percent majority the amended constitution could be ratified on 
July 30, 1989. On December 14 the same year the represent of the PDC, Patricio 
Aylwin, was elected president through support from the opposition coalition. The 
new alliance got to be known as the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia 
(the CPD) (Valenzuela 1999:231-232). 
  
 
                                                 
9 The collapse meant a downturn of 14.3 percent of GDP in 1982. 
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4.2 NEO-LIBERALISM IN CHILE 
 
The programme instituted by Pinochet can be called monetarist, economically 
liberalising, or ‘neo-conservative’, but most commonly the economic policies 
carried out through this period is labelled neo-liberalism (Brooker 2000:157). The 
neo-liberal reforms in Chile were an experiment, and according to Waagstein, the 
implementation was part of a project that sought to prevent a repetition of the so-
cialist experiments during the Allende-government (Waagstein 1989:1, 3). 
Throughout the world, Chile has become a model for reforming economies (Ed-
wards&Lederman 1998:1). MacEwan however means that the Chilean eco-
nomic/neo-liberal success is substantially overrated (MacEwan 1999:42). It is an 
interesting fact that a model implemented during an authoritarian regime, and with 
repressing measures that might not have been possible in a democracy, is used as 
a role-model. 
 The free-market economists, the Chicago Boys10, revolutionised the Chilean 
economy by lowering tariffs, privatising state corporations and pension systems, 
and by reducing the size of the state. Business leaders had gained power through 
the coup and even though they had some objections to the economic policies they 
stayed quite, knowing that a leftwing alternative was not preferable (Valenzuela 
1999:226).  
 The first wave of privatisation came during 1976-1979. Public banks and firms 
were sold (very cheap) to private owners of whom the majority nearly went bank-
rupt already in 1981. The second wave, during the mid 1980s was more cautious. 
This programme slowed down under the democratic government of 1989. Al-
though it was not complete, it is widely accepted that it was an important contri-
bution to Chile’s economic recovery during the 1990s due to its stabilising effects 
(Duquette 1999:102). 
  
4.2.1 1975-1982, From Growth to Crisis 
 
The recuperation plan implemented in 1975, under the leadership of Jorge Cauas 
and Sergio de Castro, was designed in absolute macroeconomic abstraction, with-
out any social influence, and an expression of pure liberal thought. Within two 
years inflation was drastically reduced, a major privatisation programme was 
launched, and the economy opened up for international competition. The volume 
of circulating currency was reduced almost immediately with the purpose to re-
duce domestic production. Both workers and middle class were affected directly 
by this and their income reduced by half in subsequent years (Duquette 1999:52, 
Edwards&Lederman 1998:16, 22). Much of the criticism the liberalisation pro-
gramme received in the late 1970s was centred on employment and social condi-
tions (Edwards&Lederman 1998:25). 
                                                 
10 The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean civilian economists with monetarist neo-classical 
theories, founded at the Chicago University, and their economic approach, led by Nobel-price 
winner Milton Friedman, was a completely free market. See further in Brooker 2000:145 and Gil-
lespie 1990:46ff 
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 The economic experiment of the Chilean regime was, in comparison to the 
similar regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, both the most rigorous and 
long lasting even though it produced a wave of bankruptcies, which ended in a 
financial collapse in 1982 (Gillespie 1990:46-47). 
  
4.2.2 1983-1988, From Crisis to Miracle 
 
After the economic crisis in 1982, where the private sector almost went bankrupt, 
a new stabilisation plan was put forward. This one was also constructed under 
IMF restrictions but it was surprisingly short of structural adjustment procedures. 
A more liberally orthodox plan was introduced in 1985 with a path to radical pol-
icy. The Finance Minister, Herman Büchi, demanded and received absolute free-
dom of action. Duquette explains the plan: 
 
Public expenditure was drastically reduced, and a reform of the taxation system was 
implemented to encourage private spending. The steady decline of inflation was 
therefore interpreted as a dividend of strict monetary policy, and explains the sup-
port of IMF and foreign creditors to the orthodox liberal approach consistently pur-
sued by Chile.  
Duquette 1999:52 
 
In 1985 the opposition against the military was mounting and the bolder export-
oriented strategy was launched as a response and 500 new firms entered the mar-
ket within ten years as the international demand for Chile’s natural resources ex-
panded (Duquette 1999:54).  
  
4.2.3 1989- , Democratisation 
 
The CPD had close ties to labour and popular groups, which, in combination with 
the weakness of the Communist Party, made the deepening of the free-market 
economic reforms possible. Social spending expanded significantly making a sub-
stantial dent in poverty and inequality, although income distribution remained 
heavily skewed. By the end of Aylwin’s administration Chile had become the 
fastest growing economy in Latin America. The growth rate between 1991 and 
1997 averaged over 7 percent and per capita income rose by almost 50 percent. 
The population living in poverty decreased form 39 percent to 23 percent11 
(Valenzuela 1999:232-233).  
 The Frei administration, the PDC, who came to power in 1993, followed the 
previous policy lines and sought to improve infrastructure and educational sys-
tems. The positive macroeconomic balance sheet continued, with maintained high 
growth and declined inflation levels. Like most other economies, the Chilean ex-
perienced a serious downturn related to the Asian crisis of 1998 (Valenzuela 
1999:235). 
                                                 
11 Societal effects and income inequalities will below be discussed further.  
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 Even though the policy adjustments since 1988 has included stabilisation 
measures and market-friendly strategies, most Chilean economists are today wor-
ried about the fragility of Chile’s ‘miracle’ and are promoting an extension of the 
export strategy based on higher technology (Duquette 1999:55, 101). 
 
4.2.4 Summary   
 
The neo-liberal programme carried out by Pinochet was the first experience in 
Latin America of implemented neo-liberalism. This kind of economic policy has 
five main notions: 
 
1. Open markets 
2. Free trade 
3. Reduction of the public sector 
4. Decrease of state intervention in the economy 
5. Deregulation of markets.  
 
Strong financial international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank 
are, and have been, the main recommenders of these programmes. The state 
should be small and have less participation in social services, which include edu-
cation, health, public transportation, pensions and retirement, and affordable hous-
ing. These services are better off privatised (Torres 2002:368-369). 
 The liberalising reforms have brought a steady economic growth and a 
strengthening of the Chilean State in comparison to the pre-1975 era (Diamond et 
al 1999:17-18). In Figure 212 the annual growth of GDP is shown with data 
achieved from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Except from two ma-
jor setbacks the economic growth in Chile has had a high level.  
 
 
4.3 SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Chile during Pinochet is by Rueschemeyer classified as a Bureaucratic Authori-
tarian Regime in which radical political, social, and economic changes were the 
aims. First, the organisational power of the lower classes was destroyed – eco-
nomic exclusion. However, the new policy not only hurt the working and lower 
classes, but also the middle classes and the traditional sectors of the bourgeoisie. 
Pinochet’s policies worked to destroy the party system and resulted in a signifi-
cantly weakened civil society. These policies have generated marginalisation, 
segmentation, and disintegration, which is in stark contrast to what happened in 
Brazil where new social forces were consolidated due to industrialisation and ex-
pansion of the state. This is one important factor to explain the delay of Chilean 
                                                 
12 See Appendix. 
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democratisation (along with military control and repression) (Rueschemeyer et al 
1992:210-214). 
 In the early 1970s, Chile’s social development was among the highest in Latin 
America, they had one of the best distributive situations, and in the 1980s child 
mortality was among the lowest in the region. The new policies also had severe 
negative effects, such as decreased wages. Between 1973 and 1993 real wages in 
Chile have decreased despite an average annual growth of 7 percent. This proves 
that growth per se not is enough to achieve a better income distribution, nor a 
strengthened middle class. It is however a good condition and starting point for a 
democratic government (Ffrench-Davis 1993: 12-13, 17). Between 1990 and 1996 
there was a sharp increase (47.8 percent) in per capita income in Chile, simultane-
ously the proportion of poor households decreased by 13 percentage points (Sáinz 
2000:21). 
 Most of these transfers of wealth and income were possible because of the high 
societal instability caused by the authoritarian regime. According to Ffrench-
Davis lack of stability was the main reason for several negative patterns, such as 
financial speculations, bad trends in income distribution, and decreased productiv-
ity (Ffrench-Davis 1993:20). 
 Moving from the public to the private sector means becoming subject to the 
private sphere’s labour laws, and thereby previous job security might disappear. 
In the example of teachers in Chile many had been dismissed which created a 
large ‘labour reserve’ of competition. Salaries were pushed down and tougher 
conditions set up, such as longer days. The number of pupils in each class simul-
taneously increased which made it almost impossible to keep a good, or improved, 
level on the given education. “Opportunities for health care, housing, and educa-
tion for the middle class and their children were all reduced.” (Lomnitz&Melnick 
1991:147) 
 Duquette means that the democrats today, thanks to the effective economy, 
ought to have what they need for reforms targeted on wage distribution. New 
groups are emerging in Chile demanding improvements in social welfare, such as 
agrarian reform, the sharing of authority, new housing, the improvement of health 
and education, measures against absolute poverty and marginalisation, and for 
protection of the environment (Duquette 1999:181, 182). I hope that these new 
organisations are democratic and peaceful, and that the government is able to 
communicate and be open for a dialogue, since this would lead to an increase both 
in participation and credibility. 
 One has to take into consideration that even though the political leaders of a 
new democracy very well may be true democrats, there are still strong civil 
forces. In Chile where the conservatives who had supported the military regime 
were strong and powerful, too radical measures to empower the poor (at the ex-
pense of entrepreneurs) would only yield further conflict (Duquette 1999:183-
184). 
  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
   19 
 
4.4 INCOME INEQUALITY  
 
 
The high level of income inequality in Chile, despite the decline in poverty in that 
country to moderate the levels, illustrates how economic globalization and liberali-
zation may worsen income distribution even as growth reduces absolute poverty. 
[...] For many of these countries, the neoliberal development model has yet to dem-
onstrate its ability to correct the region’s vast social inequities.  
Diamond et al 1999:53 
 
Looking back at the economic development during the military regime, de Vylder 
finds two major characteristics: (1) the majority are worse off, the shanty towns 
had a giant increase in population and big parts of the middle class saw their eco-
nomic situation worsen dramatically. (2) The best-off got even better off. These 
two factors add up to one thing: increased income inequality (de Vylder 1988:20-
21).  
 The neo-liberal model’s lack of economic steering in Chile has according to the 
UBV led to serious societal problems, such as short-term exploitation, environ-
mental effects, and an increase in poverty and marginalisation. The economic de-
velopment has during the 1990s been positive but no big improvements in income 
distribution can be seen. By the year 2000, 20 percent of the population could be 
classified as poor or extremely poor. The 10 percent richest had 41 percent of the 
country’s assets whereas the 10 percent poorest had 1.4 percent. Due to political 
measures the number of people living in poverty decreased by 1.1 percent be-
tween 1998 and 2000. Some though argue that with an economic growth of 7 per-
cent during the same period, the decrease should be better (UBV 2002). Barton 
and Murray mean that by 2000 democracy had not achieved much when it comes 
to improving the situation for the majority of Chileans (Barton&Murray 
2002:335). In Figure 313 the development of the Gini Coefficient in Chile is 
shown between 1971 and 1998. What is interesting is that it not at all has followed 
the same, or similar, patterns as the level of economic growth and that the coeffi-
cient was almost as high in 1994 with a democratic regime as in 1989 with an 
authoritarian regime.   
 However, according to the World Bank Group, Chile made great progress dur-
ing the 1990s in the struggle against poverty. Since 1989 every government has 
increased public spending on social welfare. Poverty dropped from 40 percent to 
17 percent between 1987 and 1998, and indigence was reduced from 13 percent to 
4 percent during the same period (World Bank Group 2005). 
 In the 1990s marginalisation took an interesting shape where those who had 
profited from the authoritarian regime and the economic ‘miracle’ imitated the 
wealthy North American lifestyles and consumption patterns. Simultaneously 
those on the other end remained in poverty in the shanty towns of Santiago (Bar-
ton&Murray 2002:334). 
 The success of the Chilean economic experience has also had great influence 
on Latin American political and economic leadership, and the role of economic 
                                                 
13 See Appendix 
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stability was reassessed as a necessary condition for preventing the deepening 
poverty (Iglesias 1993:24-25). The neo-liberal model rapidly spread to several 
other countries in the region. Becker means that both Chile and Latin America 
should be grateful for what neo-liberalism has done for the region, but the devel-
opment is not successfully completed:  
 
Free-market reforms have not solved all the problems of Latin American societies. 
For example, a recent World Bank study documents that this region has greater eco-
nomic inequality than other regions of the world, in good part because schooling and 
other capital investments in the very poor have been inadequate.  
Becker 1997 
 
 
4.5 ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
  
The new economic policies in almost all Latin American countries had three main 
objectives; (1) price stability through efficient markets, (2) external openness and 
international trade, and (3) authentic modernisation of the state and public poli-
cies, that is a smaller and more efficient state with less regulations of economic 
activity (Iglesias 1993:25). 
 The greatest achievements on the domestic front have been stability, invest-
ment, and production. Total openness, modernisation, and competitiveness are 
according to Iglesias crucial if the Latin American economies wish to join the 
international community as active players (Iglesias 1993:27, 30) 
 Since the 1960s, the trend in socio-economic development in Latin America 
has been positive. Though, in the 1980s inequality and poverty have increased and 
thereby the room for tolerance and compromise has shrunk (Rueschemeyer et al 
1992:155). 
 The road to recuperation of democracy in Latin America started precisely at the 
moment in which the capitalist metropolis began the neo-conservative period of 
prosperity led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan14. After 15 years of neo-
liberalism in Latin America, 15 years of patience with ‘temporary downwards’ 
and wait for improvement, the situation has worsened. There are more poor peo-
ple than before and the gap between rich and poor has increased (Borón 2000:95-
100). 
 In Argentina the middle class were the ones hardest hit by the neo-liberal poli-
cies. The working class has absorbed most of the policies’ social cost and towards 
the 1990s it had been radically change, to ‘an echo of what it ones was’. It no 
longer had its base in factors and offices but in the streets, and subject both to 
economic and social insecurity (Veltmeyer 2000:25-26).  
 Economic growth has constantly been one of the main issues for the Brazilian 
government, and they have done well. High rates of growth however coexist with 
dramatic imbalances. According to the opposition that grew stronger in the early 
1980s growth was achieved at an unacceptable social cost, namely “income con-
                                                 
14 Borón himself sees this coincidence as highly unfortunate for the Latin American countries.  
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centration, neglect of welfare investments, denationalisation of economy and cul-
ture, damage to the environment, and corruption.” (Lamounier 1999:153) 
 Measuring Brazil’s mass poverty and income inequality one finds numbers that 
are among the worst in the world. There is a combination of different factors15 
that has maintained the extreme inequalities. The fact that the country has become 
highly urbanised and mobilised must also be taken into account in this matter. 
From 1940 to 1990 population grew from 14 to 119 million and GDP/capita from 
$391 to $2.680. Income inequalities increased in the 1960s and 1970s and measur-
ing numbers from 1960, 1970, and 1980 one finds that it was drastic. These num-
bers show that no policies were implemented to shrink economic cleavages, and 
the stagnation and inflation in the 1980s and 1990s made them even deeper (La-
mounier 1999:154-156). 
 
4.5.1 Income Inequality 
 
In the framework of the ‘market friendly reforms’, the 1 percent poorest of the Latin 
American societies lost almost half of the 14 percent of their miserable income, 
while the super-rich grew theirs by 52 percent, extraordinary increasing the distance 
that separates the rich from the poor.  
Borón 2000:110 
 
Latin America has the highest average Gini Coefficient in the world. In the 1970s 
poverty and inequality declined, but sharply increased again in the 1980s, and in 
spite of economic recovery in the 1990s they have not improved. The average 
Gini Coefficient in Latin America is approximately 54 and all countries exceed 
the world average of 40 (numbers from 1995) (Székely 2000:53, 55). One major 
explanatory factor is the extremely unequal distribution of education, but the main 
causes are the macroeconomic environment and the failures in the countries’ edu-
cation policies (Behar 2000:3). 
 Most Latin American countries are classified as ‘middle-income’ countries, 
which indicates that poverty in these countries to a large extent is due to distribu-
tive problems and not to the lack of resources (such as in Africa and South Asia). 
With a different distribution policy poverty would be close to eliminated, that is 
around three percent (Székely 2000:52-53). 
 Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz mean that the exacerbated poverty and inequalities 
in many Latin American countries are a high cost of the introduction of market-
oriented economic reforms. The high cost of those implementations watered the 
growth in crime and insecurity as a result of earlier mentioned exacerbation (Dia-
mond et al 1999:16). 
 Hausman and Székely (1998) found three main characteristics that most differ-
entiates rich households from poor; education, labour force participation, and 
household size. These characteristics are interrelated (Székely 2000:61). 
                                                 
15 These were factors such as: “rapid industrial growth oriented toward a predominantly middle-
class market, high rates of population growth, and the insufficiency of investment in basic welfare 
service.” (Lamounier 1999:154-155) 
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 There is a clear conflict between democracy and social inequalities. Differen-
tiation and state institutions are one issue, land distribution is equally important 
and the examples from Latin America carry a clear message – the difference be-
tween ‘real’ and ‘formal’ democracy. Democratic institutions are not realistic if 
there have not been changes in the overall distribution of power. Equally impor-
tant is the impact of the social and economic power structure on political decision-
making. Democracy has brought about ‘symbolic’ change (Rueschemeyer et al 
1992:41-42). 
 Borón means that what we now have in Latin America are democracies without 
citizens, which serve the market and the gains only of the dominant classes 
(Borón 2000:112). 
 A more equitable distribution cannot be guaranteed only by growth. What is 
needed for an effective reduction is  
 
an approach that integrated economic and social policy in a mutually supportive re-
lationship and permits complementarity between measures to encourage competi-
tiveness and measures to promote social cohesion. Although they may seem in con-
flict in the short run, public policy can benefit from the many points of complemen-
tarity between economic and social measures. 
ECLAC 1997:4 in Duquette 1999:175 
 
ECLAC highlights here an according to me crucial factor, the interaction between 
social and economic measures. I have earlier pointed out the importance of 
communication and I do not hesitate to do so again.  
 Education is the main explanatory factor to the increased income inequalities in 
Latin America. Educational development in Latin America has been relatively 
slow in comparison to for example Korea and Taiwan. There are also extreme 
inequalities in education level and to a large extent this is connected to family 
status (different opportunities) and education policies (Székely 2000:60-61). 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
I believe that the neo-liberal model is in need of political intervention. Economic 
growth is desirable as long as it is placed where needed and it is not reasonable 
that a big part of the population live in poverty in a country with an average 
growth of GDP on 7 percent. I strongly want to emphasise the importance of 
communication and cooperation between politics and economics, and the way I 
see it one cannot work without the other to create a stable and healthy society.  
Martin Feldstein argues with the Pareto principle that ‘a change is good if it 
makes someone better off without making anyone else worse off’, but I think it is 
an arrogant assumption to claim that being well off only is a monetary question. It 
also has a lot to do with the democratic society and according to Lipset, political 
rights is more likely to be given to people that are not considered too inferior. The 
wider the inequalities, the wider differences between human beings, and the less 
likely a more democratic society. 
 
 
5.1 NEO-LIBERALISM AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
My hypothesis was that neo-liberal development breeds income inequality which 
in its turn is a threat to democracy. I find support for my hypothesis in the litera-
ture I have studied. There is no doubt of the first assumption and scholars from 
each side agree on this point, they however disagree in the question whether or 
not it is a societal menace. In this matter I support my hypothesis firstly on the 
research and ideas of the modernisation theory and the frequent comments of the 
importance of an increased and strengthened middle class. Lipset’s thesis has its 
foundation in the expanding middle class and I believe he is right. With a stronger 
middle class comes greater pressure on the government who is obliged to meet the 
mass’ demands. I consider the chain reaction from economic growth to democrati-
sation true, but not that it occurs automatically. Neo-liberal policy and economic 
growth are desirable not because they generate democratic thinking, but if they 
do. The possibility is there and it is up to politicians to seize it and administrate 
the surplus in a way that gains the mass. Great measures should be put on educa-
tion, which is the key to a more equal society. The free market is said to automati-
cally even out inequalities as long as it is allowed free space, movement, and time, 
but how long can suffering people be asked to wait? 
 Looking at Figure 2 and 3 in the appendix we see the Chilean development 
since the 1970s both concerning economic growth and income inequality. The 
annual GDP growth has had its downfalls, but it has overall been high. Simulta-
neously there have not been any significant changes in the Gini Coefficient, other 
than increasing trends apart from a dip in the early 1990s. What is most alarming 
is that the Coefficient is almost as high in 1994 as in 1989, that is, almost as high 
in the somewhat established democracy as during the transition. In chapter 2.1.2 I 
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mentioned that Pinochet himself would not be likely to strengthen the middle 
class since that means a stronger opposition, one can easily understand why noth-
ing was done to reduce the gap between rich and poor. For the democratic regime 
this should though be one of the top priorities and I do not see the small improve-
ment that has been done as acceptable. 
 This discussion is except for the question at issue even focused on some other 
distinct features that I would like to give extra attention to: (1) the middle class 
and education in the discussion on democracy, and (2) the possible contradiction 
of neo-liberal development. 
 
 
5.2 THE MIDDLE CLASS AND EDUCATION 
 
Numerous scholars on development theory highlight the strengthened middle 
class as one of the most crucial factors for democratic development. The Chilean 
neo-liberal policies have been shown to increase income inequality and weaken 
the middle class. If agreeing with Lipset on the issue that democracy is not desired 
by the elite it is understandable that Pinochet did not wish to strengthen the mid-
dle class, but the democratic regime should have been able to achieve more. I 
agree with Ffrench-Davis that this proves that economic growth does not auto-
matically generate a better income distribution or strengthened middle class. Ac-
cording to the neo-liberal adherents the market is supposed to take care of this 
problem if left undisturbed, but how long is it really possible to wait and be pa-
tient? Since a stronger middle class breeds democracy I do not see orthodox neo-
liberal policy as an alternative for developing countries. Too many are sacrificed 
along the way. 
 Education has been shown to be a crucial factor both when it comes to democ-
ratisation and income inequalities. Money has to be put on education since that is 
the keystone for democratic development and a strong middle class. In Lipset’s 
chain reaction education is very much in the beginning and without this increased 
level, the whole reaction stops. Education is what generates more equal working 
opportunities and increased participation in political life, and I believe that it is a 
fundamental weakness in the struggle against inequity. This has now improved in 
Chile but it is debateable if this improvement has been as efficient as possible.  
 Since the Chilean neo-liberal model has been shown to weaken the middle 
class, it is a threat to the democratic process, and it is clear that some political 
intervention would have been necessary.  
   
 
5.3 THE CONTRADICTION 
 
The fact that the neo-liberal development in Chile occurred under an authoritarian 
regime and Augusto Pinochet is crucial in this discussion. It is by some argued 
that the implementation of this model never would have been possible in a democ-
racy because the measures taken were too drastic and too many people suffered 
(Spannaus 2004:3). This is an important issue, and if this model is mentioned as a 
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‘miracle’ and as a model to imitate, the ones claiming so must only be focused on 
economic achievement. How can a model implemented with inhuman measures 
be used as a role-model? The Chilean model clearly needs revising. 
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6. CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
 
My hypothesis was that neo-liberal development breeds income inequality which 
in its turn is a threat to democracy, and the question at issue was: Can increased 
income inequality be regarded as an effect of neo-liberal development and how 
does it affect society?  
 As stated in the discussion neo-liberal development does breed income inequal-
ity and I see it as a threat to democracy. With income inequality comes a weak-
ened middle class which is essential for democratic development. It affects society 
negatively by distinguishing rich from poor and without any political intervention 
this leads to people not having the same opportunities when it comes to social 
welfare.  
 Economic growth is desirable since it can generate working opportunities and 
increased well-being for the mass, but what is needed is political interaction be-
tween economic and political policy. There must be regulated labour laws that set 
the conditions in which people work. These regulations for example concern 
minimum wage, working hours, employment security, and the freedom to join 
different labour unions.  
 Education is one of the strongest and most emphasised features throughout the 
literature concerning this matter and I too believe that is where improvements 
have to begin.  
 Since income inequality is a threat to democratic development measures must 
be conceived in order to decrease marginalisation, which is an interesting topic for 
future research. I believe that there must be a way for economic growth and equal-
ity to coexist. In order to reach a conclusion that successfully can be implemented 
in society this research should be carried out by a group where various schools are 
represented, such as researchers in economy, politics, law, and social anthropol-
ogy.  
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 APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation between level of democracy and income inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Länder03 Database  
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Figure 1a and 1b. Correlation between Gini Coefficient and the level of democ-
racy in the world 
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Sources: 1973-1987 from de Vylder 1988:22; 1989-2004 From Theodora. 
 
Figure 2. GDP Growth in Chile 1973-2004  
 
 
 
Sources: Robinson 2001:13 and Székely 2001:14 
 
Figure 3. Development of Gini Coefficient in Chile 1971-1998  
 
